Several serious questions arise from a detailed study of the Secretary of State’s testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and to the US House International Relations Committee on 05 April 2006. This, plus a scrutiny of the replies to the “82 Questions for the Record”, sent by Senator Lugar to the Bush administration, generate grave doubts about the proposed India-US Nuclear Agreement. These must be answered unambiguously by our government.
Nuclear Weapons’ State (NWS)
The first is the question of NWS. US Secretary of State Rice, in her testimony says that this “initiative with India does not seek to renegotiate or amend the NPT. India is not and is not going to become a member of the NPT (as) a nuclear weapons state.”
As India cannot be a NWS without subscribing to the NPT, and if it is not a NWS, then India can simply not have the “same benefits and advantages” as the “US has”.
This must be fully clarified by the Prime Minister, and to the satisfaction of the country, otherwise a great deal of the prevailing confusion will spread further.
Voluntary Subscription to NSG Standards
Repeatedly it is asserted by Senators as also by Secretary Rice that: [Emphasis added]
* “That the NPT is the cornerstone…… that the Nuclear Suppliers Group has … certain standards of behavior. India is agreeing to adhere to those unilaterally. Through the Missile Control Technology Regime, (sic) which India is agreeing to adhere to unilaterally. [Emphasis added]
*
“And so I have – I think we have to think about the energy and nonproliferation as two halves of this same walnut.”
(Condoleezza Rice)
Against these assertions our Government has to explain, firstly, whether we have agreed to “unilaterally” adhere to the NSG criteria and obligations?
Secondly, does the Government agree that energy and non-proliferation are two conjoined halves? Thirdly, how then do the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary repeatedly emphasize that this Agreement is about “Energy”, not about “Arms control”, or “Non-proliferation”, because both cannot be asserted, what the Government of India says and what U.S. Secretary of State has repeatedly testified. Either the “two halves of the walnut” will have to be separated, or the theory itself rejected.
This difference needs to be reconciled, it is important that it be done now, before negotiations proceed any further.
In addition to above, Secretary Rice has also said that India is already discussing with the United States of America its “potential participation in the proliferation security initiative”.
Is this correct?
The Government should keep the country informed rather than our learning of such developments from the US.
The country has also a right to know whether the Government has given it consent or is going to “unilaterally” subscribe to obligations like the FMCT, (implying a nuclear fuel cap), or the MTCR (which means curbs on missile development)?
All these proposals have serious national security consequences. We urge the Government against any unilateral adoption of these restraints, and that, too, without full consultations with the Opposition and the Parliament.
Additional protocol
It is disappointing that, whereas, the Government has not yet shared with the country any aspects of the Additional Protocol being negotiated with the IAEA, on grounds of it as ‘still to be initiated’, the MEA has already discussed important aspects of it with the US Administration. This is highly objectionable, and discriminatory against our own Parliament as well as the country.
That is the Government must clarify whether it is negotiating, or intends to negotiate with the IAEA, this Additional Protocol, prior to adoption of the Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954?
Is it then correct that this ‘additional protocol’, will be examined by US President/ US Congress, who jointly or severally will decide whether this is an “acceptable agreement”?
This raises several serious questions about the role and relevance of our Parliament, the Government’s responsibility to the Parliament, and to the country. This also runs counter to the PM and the GoI’s commitment to the Parliament whereby the PM had assured the country that only after the ‘Waiver Bill’ (as this Bill is also called) is enacted, will the Government go to the IAEA for negotiations. Why has this priority been reversed?
Secondly, by this’ Waiver Bill’ every transaction that India might, in future, have with the US will be subject to an “examination for waiver” by the President/ the Congress, and until they make their determination, about the adequacy or otherwise of the safeguards, no automatic approval will follow. And this despite the additional protocol with the IAEA. Is this a correct interpretation?
Fissile material
A very short extract of the testimony of Senator Sarbanes and the Secretary of State’s response to that (all emphasis added) are shared here to illustrate our concern:
Sen. Sarbanes: But this is -- this is -- this is further complicated because other partners, as I understand it now, have undertaken not to produce fissile materials, is that correct?
Sec. Rice: Other partners are, of course, nuclear -- non-nuclear weapons states at this point, but --
Sen. Sarbanes: And the nuclear weapons states have undertaken not to produce additional fissile material?
Sec. Rice: No, Senator. As a matter of fact, there is a -- an international effort under way for a fissile material cut-off treaty, which the United States supports. But we have a moratorium, that's right, on fissile material production, and we've encouraged others to do that.
Would the Prime Minister therefore, kindly clarify as to how this testimony is to be interpreted? The Prime Minister had informed the Parliament, and that, too, repeatedly that:
(a) everything will be reciprocal;
(b) we will have the same status, benefits as the United States of America, indeed as all advanced Nuclear States.
(c) then how have we unilaterally volunteered a control over production of our fissile material?
(d) Or, intend to in the near future?
Does that assurance hold despite the Secretary of State’s testimony?
NPT - IAEA
At another part of this testimony, in response to Senator Kerry, Secretary of State Rice says: (Emphasis added)
Sec. Rice: Well, we will certainly press it, Senator, both the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and the IAEA safeguards. During the recent visit of Mr. Saran, I told him in no uncertain terms that this is going to be an issue with Congress and that they ought to negotiate with the IAEA as quickly as possible.
Would the Government confirm, or deny, that this is indeed how Secretary of State enjoined our Foreign Secretary, “in no uncertain terms,” about negotiating with the IAEA as “quickly as possible”. This yet again, then runs counter to the PM’s assurances and announced procedure.
Another portion of the statement by Secretary of State, in the very same testimony with Sen. Kerry, emphasises that:
“By adhering to these various regimes, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the NSG guidelines, they can help us to expand the concept of what is the nuclear proliferation regime, because the NPT is an important part of it. But we clearly need more than the NPT. And I want to emphasize again that on the Proliferation Security Initiative we will press very hard.”
A very other important aspect relates to the NPT. Successive governments of India have stayed well away from this Treaty, for in our view, this was held as a device for perpetuating “nuclear apartheid”. Now something “more than the NPT” is being planned. Is the Government in agreement with this proposal? And would the Government also explain what this “more than the NPT” is?
IAEA
On the question of the IAEA, Secretary of State informed the House International Relations Committee:
“It puts two-thirds of India's reactors under safeguards. It puts all future civil -- civilian reactors under safeguards. Because of the pressures for India to expand its civilian program, the Indians estimate that this could, within a decade or so, put as much as 90 percent of their reactors under safeguards. And as Mohamed ElBaradei has noted, because it brings the IAEA finally into sustained contact with the Indian program, it opens up this program in ways that it has currently not been opened up. And I think those are the values to the nonproliferation regime that others are beginning to see.”
Is this what the Government has shared with the US Administration? Also, is this view of the IAEA in consonance with our policies? The Prime Minister must share the Government’s reaction to this.
Reciprocal and Reversible
The Prime Minister has repeatedly informed our Parliament that should the United States of America not fulfill its part of obligations then, of course, India will be under no obligation to pursue the agreement either. This has been stated by the Government, and its spokesmen, on several occasions. That is why it is illuminating to read the contribution of Senator Feingold:
“Sen. Feingold: Thank you, Madame Secretary. (Emphasis added)
You said that the safeguards will be permanent, but India emphasized that these, quote, "permanent" safeguards would be predicated on an uninterrupted supply of fuel for civilian reactors. Now, doesn't that tie our hands down the road?
Sec. Rice: We've been very clear with the Indians that the permanence of the safeguard is permanence of the safeguards, without condition. In fact, we reserve the right, should India test, as it has agreed not to do, or should India in any way violate the IAEA safeguards agreements to which it would be adhering, (then) the deal from our point of view would at that point be off.”
We would request the Prime Minister to make the position of the Government explicit in this regard.
CTBT in disguise
The Government has explained that it is not accepting the CTBT in disguise. But the Government has affirmed its commitment to the July 18 Statement. Will India, thereby have to forsake all nuclear testing for always? Does the US have any such corresponding obligation with us? Further, does this not amount to ‘capping’ our programme? And, does it also not cripple all our future scientific developments in the nuclear field? Is the Government rejecting the testimony of the Secretary of State and her interpretation of the Agreement of July 18, (“permanent is permanent”) and all subsequent statements on the subject?
Iran
Does the Government of India recognize that because Iran is a major policy platform of the U.S., therefore, India is now expected to subscribe to and share, and/or be in sympathy with that U.S. policy priority. Does the Prime Minister concur with and accept the US position?
Conclusion
What the government has offered to the US results in a significant erosion of our strategic space; an abandoning of our autonomy of action; placing 90% of our nuclear plants on surveillance by an intrusive IAEA regime; and all this for just about 8% of our energy requirements of around 2025, which, too, will become operational (in about 15-20 years) only if all goes well. This is a very costly, an ill-assessed and an imbalanced agreement.
The “emerging India-US partnership” must flourish, but it can do so only if each side “clearly understand(s) what has brought them together,” and what the other wants from it. Any curbing of India’s decision making processes, of its autonomy and sovereign space for action, is certainly not what can be bargained for the illusion of ‘energy security’ about 20 years from now.
The BJP has always worked for and is committed to a healthy, flourishing and a very cooperative relationship with the United States of America; indeed, a dynamic ‘strategic partnership’; but a relationship and partnership between two sovereign nations, even if they be unequal in national power quotients at present.
This agreement, designed by the UPA Government, and all its allies, is not in accord with our national interests, and that is the only litmus test: of national interest, against which we can assess issues of such central importance.
Nuclear Weapons’ State (NWS)
The first is the question of NWS. US Secretary of State Rice, in her testimony says that this “initiative with India does not seek to renegotiate or amend the NPT. India is not and is not going to become a member of the NPT (as) a nuclear weapons state.”
As India cannot be a NWS without subscribing to the NPT, and if it is not a NWS, then India can simply not have the “same benefits and advantages” as the “US has”.
This must be fully clarified by the Prime Minister, and to the satisfaction of the country, otherwise a great deal of the prevailing confusion will spread further.
Voluntary Subscription to NSG Standards
Repeatedly it is asserted by Senators as also by Secretary Rice that: [Emphasis added]
* “That the NPT is the cornerstone…… that the Nuclear Suppliers Group has … certain standards of behavior. India is agreeing to adhere to those unilaterally. Through the Missile Control Technology Regime, (sic) which India is agreeing to adhere to unilaterally. [Emphasis added]
*
“And so I have – I think we have to think about the energy and nonproliferation as two halves of this same walnut.”
(Condoleezza Rice)
Against these assertions our Government has to explain, firstly, whether we have agreed to “unilaterally” adhere to the NSG criteria and obligations?
Secondly, does the Government agree that energy and non-proliferation are two conjoined halves? Thirdly, how then do the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary repeatedly emphasize that this Agreement is about “Energy”, not about “Arms control”, or “Non-proliferation”, because both cannot be asserted, what the Government of India says and what U.S. Secretary of State has repeatedly testified. Either the “two halves of the walnut” will have to be separated, or the theory itself rejected.
This difference needs to be reconciled, it is important that it be done now, before negotiations proceed any further.
In addition to above, Secretary Rice has also said that India is already discussing with the United States of America its “potential participation in the proliferation security initiative”.
Is this correct?
The Government should keep the country informed rather than our learning of such developments from the US.
The country has also a right to know whether the Government has given it consent or is going to “unilaterally” subscribe to obligations like the FMCT, (implying a nuclear fuel cap), or the MTCR (which means curbs on missile development)?
All these proposals have serious national security consequences. We urge the Government against any unilateral adoption of these restraints, and that, too, without full consultations with the Opposition and the Parliament.
Additional protocol
It is disappointing that, whereas, the Government has not yet shared with the country any aspects of the Additional Protocol being negotiated with the IAEA, on grounds of it as ‘still to be initiated’, the MEA has already discussed important aspects of it with the US Administration. This is highly objectionable, and discriminatory against our own Parliament as well as the country.
That is the Government must clarify whether it is negotiating, or intends to negotiate with the IAEA, this Additional Protocol, prior to adoption of the Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954?
Is it then correct that this ‘additional protocol’, will be examined by US President/ US Congress, who jointly or severally will decide whether this is an “acceptable agreement”?
This raises several serious questions about the role and relevance of our Parliament, the Government’s responsibility to the Parliament, and to the country. This also runs counter to the PM and the GoI’s commitment to the Parliament whereby the PM had assured the country that only after the ‘Waiver Bill’ (as this Bill is also called) is enacted, will the Government go to the IAEA for negotiations. Why has this priority been reversed?
Secondly, by this’ Waiver Bill’ every transaction that India might, in future, have with the US will be subject to an “examination for waiver” by the President/ the Congress, and until they make their determination, about the adequacy or otherwise of the safeguards, no automatic approval will follow. And this despite the additional protocol with the IAEA. Is this a correct interpretation?
Fissile material
A very short extract of the testimony of Senator Sarbanes and the Secretary of State’s response to that (all emphasis added) are shared here to illustrate our concern:
Sen. Sarbanes: But this is -- this is -- this is further complicated because other partners, as I understand it now, have undertaken not to produce fissile materials, is that correct?
Sec. Rice: Other partners are, of course, nuclear -- non-nuclear weapons states at this point, but --
Sen. Sarbanes: And the nuclear weapons states have undertaken not to produce additional fissile material?
Sec. Rice: No, Senator. As a matter of fact, there is a -- an international effort under way for a fissile material cut-off treaty, which the United States supports. But we have a moratorium, that's right, on fissile material production, and we've encouraged others to do that.
Would the Prime Minister therefore, kindly clarify as to how this testimony is to be interpreted? The Prime Minister had informed the Parliament, and that, too, repeatedly that:
(a) everything will be reciprocal;
(b) we will have the same status, benefits as the United States of America, indeed as all advanced Nuclear States.
(c) then how have we unilaterally volunteered a control over production of our fissile material?
(d) Or, intend to in the near future?
Does that assurance hold despite the Secretary of State’s testimony?
NPT - IAEA
At another part of this testimony, in response to Senator Kerry, Secretary of State Rice says: (Emphasis added)
Sec. Rice: Well, we will certainly press it, Senator, both the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and the IAEA safeguards. During the recent visit of Mr. Saran, I told him in no uncertain terms that this is going to be an issue with Congress and that they ought to negotiate with the IAEA as quickly as possible.
Would the Government confirm, or deny, that this is indeed how Secretary of State enjoined our Foreign Secretary, “in no uncertain terms,” about negotiating with the IAEA as “quickly as possible”. This yet again, then runs counter to the PM’s assurances and announced procedure.
Another portion of the statement by Secretary of State, in the very same testimony with Sen. Kerry, emphasises that:
“By adhering to these various regimes, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the NSG guidelines, they can help us to expand the concept of what is the nuclear proliferation regime, because the NPT is an important part of it. But we clearly need more than the NPT. And I want to emphasize again that on the Proliferation Security Initiative we will press very hard.”
A very other important aspect relates to the NPT. Successive governments of India have stayed well away from this Treaty, for in our view, this was held as a device for perpetuating “nuclear apartheid”. Now something “more than the NPT” is being planned. Is the Government in agreement with this proposal? And would the Government also explain what this “more than the NPT” is?
IAEA
On the question of the IAEA, Secretary of State informed the House International Relations Committee:
“It puts two-thirds of India's reactors under safeguards. It puts all future civil -- civilian reactors under safeguards. Because of the pressures for India to expand its civilian program, the Indians estimate that this could, within a decade or so, put as much as 90 percent of their reactors under safeguards. And as Mohamed ElBaradei has noted, because it brings the IAEA finally into sustained contact with the Indian program, it opens up this program in ways that it has currently not been opened up. And I think those are the values to the nonproliferation regime that others are beginning to see.”
Is this what the Government has shared with the US Administration? Also, is this view of the IAEA in consonance with our policies? The Prime Minister must share the Government’s reaction to this.
Reciprocal and Reversible
The Prime Minister has repeatedly informed our Parliament that should the United States of America not fulfill its part of obligations then, of course, India will be under no obligation to pursue the agreement either. This has been stated by the Government, and its spokesmen, on several occasions. That is why it is illuminating to read the contribution of Senator Feingold:
“Sen. Feingold: Thank you, Madame Secretary. (Emphasis added)
You said that the safeguards will be permanent, but India emphasized that these, quote, "permanent" safeguards would be predicated on an uninterrupted supply of fuel for civilian reactors. Now, doesn't that tie our hands down the road?
Sec. Rice: We've been very clear with the Indians that the permanence of the safeguard is permanence of the safeguards, without condition. In fact, we reserve the right, should India test, as it has agreed not to do, or should India in any way violate the IAEA safeguards agreements to which it would be adhering, (then) the deal from our point of view would at that point be off.”
We would request the Prime Minister to make the position of the Government explicit in this regard.
CTBT in disguise
The Government has explained that it is not accepting the CTBT in disguise. But the Government has affirmed its commitment to the July 18 Statement. Will India, thereby have to forsake all nuclear testing for always? Does the US have any such corresponding obligation with us? Further, does this not amount to ‘capping’ our programme? And, does it also not cripple all our future scientific developments in the nuclear field? Is the Government rejecting the testimony of the Secretary of State and her interpretation of the Agreement of July 18, (“permanent is permanent”) and all subsequent statements on the subject?
Iran
Does the Government of India recognize that because Iran is a major policy platform of the U.S., therefore, India is now expected to subscribe to and share, and/or be in sympathy with that U.S. policy priority. Does the Prime Minister concur with and accept the US position?
Conclusion
What the government has offered to the US results in a significant erosion of our strategic space; an abandoning of our autonomy of action; placing 90% of our nuclear plants on surveillance by an intrusive IAEA regime; and all this for just about 8% of our energy requirements of around 2025, which, too, will become operational (in about 15-20 years) only if all goes well. This is a very costly, an ill-assessed and an imbalanced agreement.
The “emerging India-US partnership” must flourish, but it can do so only if each side “clearly understand(s) what has brought them together,” and what the other wants from it. Any curbing of India’s decision making processes, of its autonomy and sovereign space for action, is certainly not what can be bargained for the illusion of ‘energy security’ about 20 years from now.
The BJP has always worked for and is committed to a healthy, flourishing and a very cooperative relationship with the United States of America; indeed, a dynamic ‘strategic partnership’; but a relationship and partnership between two sovereign nations, even if they be unequal in national power quotients at present.
This agreement, designed by the UPA Government, and all its allies, is not in accord with our national interests, and that is the only litmus test: of national interest, against which we can assess issues of such central importance.
(Shyam Jaju)
Office incharge
Office incharge
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